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The public health costs of job loss
Abstract
We study the short-run effect of involuntary job loss on comprehensive measures of public health costs.
We focus on job loss induced by plant closure, thereby addressing the reverse causality problem as job
displacements due to plant closure are unlikely caused by workers' health status, but potentially have
important effects on individual workers' health and associated public health costs. Our empirical
analysis is based on a rich data set from Austria providing comprehensive information on various types
of health care costs and day-by-day work history at the individual level. Our central findings are: (i)
overall expenditures on medical treatments are not strongly affected by job displacement; (ii) job loss
significantly increases expenditures for antidepressants and related drugs, as well as for hospitalizations
due to mental health problems for men (but not for women) although the effects are economically rather
small; and (iii) sickness benefits strongly increase due to job loss.
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Abstract
We study the short-run effect of involuntary job loss on comprehensive measures of public
health costs. We focus on job loss induced by plant closure, thereby addressing the reverse
causality problem as job displacements due to plant closure are unlikely caused by workers’
health status, but potentially have important effects on individual workers’ health and asso-
ciated public health costs. Our empirical analysis is based on a rich data set from Austria
providing comprehensive information on various types of health care costs and day-by-day
work history at the individual level. Our central findings are: (i) overall expenditures on
medical treatments are not strongly affected by job displacement; (ii) job loss significantly
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the causal effect of job loss due to plant closure on public expenditures for
health care. Understanding this effect is important for at least four reasons. First, ill health and
job loss are the two major risks during an individual’s working life. While a large literature has
studied the interactions between job loss and health, the literature has barely addressed the issue
how job losses affect public health costs. Second, understanding the causal relationship between
job loss and health costs is important for both labor market policy and health policy. Labor
market policies that focus on preventing job loss might be even more beneficial to society if they
are providing employment to job losers and avoid deteriorating health conditions at the same
time. Health policy makers are interested in this relationship to assess the effects of changing
conditions on the labor market on the expenditures for health care. Third, the effects of job loss
on public health costs may also depend on institutional rules. The public health care systems
of many European members of the OECD do not only cover the direct health care costs (doctor
visits, hospitalizations, and medical drugs) but they also provide insurance against income losses
in case of sickness. Understanding which component of health care contributes to overall costs
is crucial. Fourth, health care costs have risen strongly in the last decades in most industrialized
countries (Hagist and Kotlikoff, 2005) and it is thus interesting to know how the dynamics of
these costs relate to job instability and loss of employment.
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the causal effect of job loss on
comprehensive measures of public health costs. The empirical analysis is based on data from
Austria – a country that is ideally suited to addressing the role of job loss in health care costs
for various reasons. On the one hand, health insurance in Austria is mandatory for all employed
individuals and their dependants. While subjective health status can not be measured in our
setting, the fact that health insurance coverage is universal suggests that health care costs are
more informative on the evolution of underlying health status than in settings where health
insurance is not mandatory. On the other hand, the Austrian system does not only cover costs
associated with take-up of health care (such as doctor visits, hospitalizations, and medical drugs)
but also provides insurance against income losses. However, while direct take-up of health care
is informative on the health status of an individual, public health costs associated with sickness
benefits are also driven by institutional rules and incentives created by such rules. Aiming to
provide comprehensive information, our empirical analysis will distinguish between costs asso-
ciated with take-up of health care and costs due to sickness benefit payments.1 However, in
1When we talk about “public health costs” associated with unemployment, we strictly refer to costs that are
associated with payments by the public health insurance system, i.e. sickness benefits and take-up of health
provisions. From the point of view of public health insurance, additional costs arise due to reduced health
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contrast to typical European health insurance systems, deductibles in the Austrian system are
non-negligible. Moreover, the Austrian health insurance system is embedded in an unemploy-
ment insurance system that is more restrictive than in other European countries and closer to
the U.S. system. Regular unemployment benefits are paid for at most 30 weeks and the net
replacement ratio (i.e. unemployment benefits relative to previous net earnings) is about 55
percent. This means that studying the Austrian context allows assessing the overall financial
and non-financial repercussions of job loss on health care costs. However, assessing the causal
effect of job loss on public health costs is difficult because deteriorating health status can be a
cause rather than a consequence of job loss. In other words, health-driven selection of the unem-
ployed may lead to a bias in the causal effect of unemployment on health costs in cross-sectional
data.2 In order to address the problem of reverse causality, we focus on the effects of job loss
following plant closure on public health care costs. The shut-down of a firm strongly disrupts a
worker’s employment career as it leads to job loss with certainty. Yet workers’ health is unlikely
to cause a plant closure, except in the case of self-employment.
This paper goes beyond the existing literature by combining rich administrative data, using
plant closures as the identification strategy, and several measures of take-up of primary health
care and then especially drug prescription. There are three important aspects of our data. First,
we study the effects of job loss on costs associated with take-up of primary health care rather
than on direct (self-reported or diagnosis-based) measures of a worker’s health. As the Austrian
system provides comprehensive coverage of health care benefits for all employed workers, the
public health care system faces potentially high additional costs associated with unemployment.
It is thus of primary interest to policy makers to have reliable information on the health costs
that are causally related to workers’ employment status. Second, our study aims to give a broad
picture of the overall health costs to the public health insurance associated with the experience
of job loss. The Austrian system does not only cover costs associated with medical treatment
but also grants sickness transfer payments both for employed workers incapable of working due
to health problems and for unemployed workers incapable of searching for a new job. In our
empirical analysis we will assess the causal effect of job loss on overall costs. Moreover, we
also analyze the cost structure, i.e. how these overall costs are divided into the interesting
subcategories. Third, in contrast to most previous studies, we use a very large and informative
data set. Our data come from the Austrian health insurance register and cover all health-care
insurance contributions when an individual loses his or her job.
2Stewart (2001) shows that the more unhealthy are more likely to enter unemployment and hence the unhealthy
are over-represented in the unemployment stock. Martikainen and Valkonen (1996) show that the relationship
between unemployment and mortality weakened in Finland as unemployment rose, suggesting that health selection
varies over the business cycle. See also the discussion on the effects of health on labor market attachment in Currie
and Madrian (1999).
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related payments to private sector employees in one large Austrian region.3 For the period 1998
– 2002, we can link the health cost data with social security register data (reporting a worker’s
employment and earnings history), and our analysis is based on a large sample of workers. One
obvious advantage of these data sets is their accuracy. Because data collection is associated
with the entitlement to, and the actual payment of, social benefits there is little measurement
error both with respect to health-cost and employment-status information. Another advantage
is that all workers have the same health insurance coverage which is given by a standardized
catalogue of health care benefits that are covered by the public health insurance system. Hence
our measure of health costs is also highly informative on the workers health status.4 In terms
of identification, our paper expands on the extensive literature that tries to assess the causal
impact of job loss on health outcomes by employing modern econometric evaluation methods.
In particular, our identification strategy uses plant closure as exogenous source of job loss, and
we employ propensity score matching techniques to make plant-closure and non-plant closure
workers comparable.5
Our empirical analysis yields four major results. First, plant closure does not cause a sig-
nificant increase in public health costs associated with take-up of health care in the year after
plant closure. Public health costs associated with hospitalizations and medical drugs do not
increase, and doctor visits even decrease somewhat.6 Second, we find no anticipatory effects
on overall health costs. In terms of health cost subgroups, we find no anticipatory effects for
men. In contrast, women spend more days on sick leave in the half-year before plant closure.
Third, while overall take-up is not significantly affected, we find – for males, but not for females
– a significant increase in the prescriptions of antidepressants and related drugs (“psychotropic
drugs”). Moreover, we find that, for males only again, job loss results in an increase in hos-
pitalizations for mental health reasons. This suggests that job loss causes significant mental
health problems for males. Fourth, we find that the public health costs due to sickness benefit
3Our study focuses on Upper Austria which is one of totally nine Austrian states. Upper Austria, located in the
north and bordering Germany and the Czech Republic, comprises roughly one sixth of the Austrian population
and work force.
4The public health insurance system aims at a basic coverage of all major health risks. Individuals with
demand for services not covered by the public health insurance system (mainly better quality, such as one-
bedroom hospitalization) can purchase such services from private health insurance companies. Private companies
cover costs beyond the public system.
5From a methodological point of view, our analysis is close in spirit to the Swedish study by Eliason and Storrie
(2009) who study the impact of job loss on mortality and the Danish study by Browning et al. (2006) who look
at the impact of job loss on hospitalizations.
6While our paper focuses on the impact of individual unemployment on public health costs for the same
individual, note that a different literature which looks at relationships at the more aggregate level provides
similar results. Studying aggregate health in good times and bad times, Ruhm (2000) finds lower mortality rates
during recessions. This is in line with predictions of the economic theory of health production which holds that
reduced opportunity costs of time increase incentives to undertake health investments through time-consuming
activities which may improve health during times of high unemployment (Grossman, 1972).
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payments strongly increase after a job loss. Plant closure more than doubles expenditures on
sickness benefits: Overall health care costs increase by 360 Euros for men and by almost 212
Euros for women in the span of one year. However, this increase in costs does not necessarily
reflect a deteriorating health status of displaced workers, but may also relate to sickness benefit
rules: For employed workers, employers have to bear sickness benefits for up to 12 weeks (de-
pending on job tenure) whereas for unemployed workers it is the public health insurance which
pays the sickness benefits.7 Since plant closure workers spend more time in unemployment than
non-plant closure workers this increase in costs is largely mechanical. This is confirmed when
we look at days on sick leave, which are recorded in the same way both for employed and non-
employed individuals. For males, we do not find that job loss due to plant closure causes more
sickness days. For females, however, we find a significant increase in the number of days on
sickness benefits.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a brief review
of the previous literature. Section 3 presents the data and definitions of the crucial variables.
In section 4 we discuss the econometric methodology and the empirical strategy to identify the
causal impact of job loss on public health costs. Section 5 presents the empirical results on the
relationship between job loss and associated costs to the public health care system. Section 6
concludes.
2 Related literature
Our study is related to various strands of the literature that analyzes the impact of job loss
(or unemployment) on take-up of public health care. Iversen et al. (1989) find rising hospital
admissions in a sample of Danish workers after a large shipyard closure and Keefe et al. (2002)
report excess risk of self-harm leading to hospitalization or death in a sample of workers displaced
after bankruptcy of a meat-processing plant. Browning et al. (2006), using a large sample of
the Danish males over the period 1981-1999, find no significant effect of job loss on rates of
hospitalization for stress-related diseases such as high blood pressure and heart diseases. Carr-
Hill et al. (1996) and Field and Briggs (2001) find that the jobless workers in the UK do
consult general practitioners more often than employed workers with similar characteristics.
Similar evidence was found for a large furniture plant closure in Austria (Studnicka et al., 1991).
D’Arcy and Siddique (1985) provide evidence from the Canadian health care survey that the
unemployed use public health care more heavily than workers with a job. Such evidence may
7When a worker gets sick during an unemployment spell, the time of regular unemployment benefits is in-
terrupted and the worker becomes eligible for sickness benefits so each day on sickness benefits prolongs the
maximum duration of regular unemployment benefits.
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indicate that unemployment leads to health problems. However, it is also consistent with the
economic theory of health production (Grossman, 1972), which predicts increased incentives to
invest in time-consuming health activities during periods of reduced opportunity cost of time
such as unemployment. Other studies find that the unemployed make less use of the public health
care system even when they are eligible for health care services. Ahs and Westerling (2006)
and Virtanen (1993) study Scandinavian experiences and find that unemployment is associated
with lack of unmet care needs, particularly among unemployed who suffer from psychological
symptoms. One possible explanation for such a result is based upon the behavioral model of
health care use (Andersen, 1995), which stresses that the take-up of health care benefits is not
only influenced by need of care but also by individual predisposition and social context.
Our study is most closely related, both in data and methodology, to Browning et al. (2006).
Unlike Browning et al. (2006) (and the other above studies) we consider take-up of all kinds of
health care provisions covered by public health insurance to get a full picture how job losses
affects the public care costs.
A second related literature studies the relationship between unemployment and sickness
insurance use. Johansson and Palme (1996, 2005) study how changes in the income replacement
level affect the incidence and duration of sick leave spells in Sweden (see also Henrekson and
Persson (2004) for a related study). Askildsen et al. (2005) argue that the negative relationship
between unemployment and sickness insurance use may be due to worker moral hazard in a
situation of full insurance against income loss. While our study is related to this literature,
we do not assess the incentive effects of health insurance rules. Our paper contributes to this
literature by studying the effects of exogenous job loss on public health costs associated with
take-up of sickness benefits.
In a broader perspective, our paper is related to the large literature on the effect of job loss
(or unemployment) on individual health.8 Early studies (e.g. Moser et al., 1987; Morris et al.,
1994) find that the unemployed have significantly higher mortality rates.9 Nylen et al. (2001)
and Voss et al. (2004) examine mortality of Swedish twins in relation to unemployment and
find that experiencing unemployment in the year 1973 is associated with a higher probability to
commit suicide or die from undetermined causes during the period 1974-1996. Sullivan and von
Wachter (2006), using administrative data from two US states, estimate a 15-20% excess risk of
death in the 20 years following a job loss. Eliason and Storrie (2009) provide similar evidence
8Cook (1985), Morris and Cook (1991) and Jin et al. (1995) survey the early literature. Platt (1984) documents
the effects of unemployment on suicidal behavior. For recent surveys see Kasl and Jones (2000, 2006).
9An important strand of the literature has studied the impact of aggregate unemployment on mortality. The
early work of Brenner (1979) points to a positive relationship. However, the more recent literature has convincingly
demonstrated that recessions and high local unemployment rates reduce rather than increase mortality (Ruhm,
2000, 2003, 2005, Gerdtham and Ruhm, 2006).
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for job losers in Sweden. Kessler et al. (1987, 1989) look at the impact of unemployment and
re-employment on self-reported health. Turner (1995) investigates the relative importance of
financial strain and emotional distress for health problems after losing the job. Burgard et al.
(2005) show that health effects are strongest for those who experience a health shock after a job
loss or who lose their jobs for health reasons. However, adverse health effects are also existent
for other workers experiencing a job loss. Our study focuses on costs associated with morbidity
(rather than mortality) and uses public health cost measures (rather than self-reported health)
to investigate the relationship between job loss and health.
A further strand of the literature studies the effect of unemployment on subjective well-being.
Warr (1987) emphasizes the importance of environmental features of work such as opportunity
of control, interpersonal contact, and a socially valued position for subjective well-being. As a
result, the loss of a job detrimentally affects well-being and may cause serious problems for mental
health. Clark and Oswald (1994) and Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) document the close
relationship between unemployment and unhappiness, and Stutzer and Lalive (2004) show that
this effect depends on the social norm to live off one’s own income. Theodossiou (1998) finds
that the unemployed suffer more from anxiety, depression and loss of confidence compared to
otherwise similar employed individuals. Bjorklund (1985) finds evidence that unemployment has
detrimental health effects in Sweden. Other studies focus on youth workers and find detrimental
effects of unemployment on well-being (e.g. Goldsmith et al. (1996) for the United States and
Korpi (1997) for Sweden). Our study indirectly addresses related issues by exploring the impact
of job loss on more detailed health costs categories such as the consumption of antidepressants
and similar medical drugs as well as hospitalization for mental reasons. Effects on such public
health costs arguably mirror a detrimental impact of job loss on subjective well-being.
3 Data and definition of variables
3.1 Data sources
We draw on social security register data that can be linked to data from the statutory health
insurance fund of a large region in Austria (“Upper Austria”).10 Data from the statutory
health insurance record all payments by the health insurance fund related to a worker’s take-
up of health care benefits and cover the five-year period from January 1, 1998 to December
31, 2002. We also use data from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which covers
10The administration of the health insurance is divided into regional units (“Gebietskrankenkassen”, GKK) and
our data set comes from the GKK of Upper Austria, one of the nine Austrian states and located in the north of
the country. This region covers about one sixth of the total Austrian population and work force.
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individuals employed in the private sector and provides information, on a daily basis, on the
workers’ earnings and employment history.11 The data do only include workers in dependent
employment and do not include the self-employed, as a separate public insurance agency for the
self-employed covers health risks of sole proprietor owners not included in our data. The data
also contain relevant individual characteristics (such as age, sex, and broad occupation) but lack
other relevant information (such as education and family background).
The combination of these two data sets provides rich information on a worker’s employment
and public health costs. Two additional features make these data ideally suited for the present
analysis. A first feature is that the data cover the universe of the private sector employees (more
than 80% of the active state population) in the region.12 Moreover, because each employed
worker can be linked to a particular firm via a unique firm identifier and because the data set
covers the universe of workers, we can perfectly reconstruct firms. A “firm” is simply defined as
the set of individuals observed under a given employer social security number (“firm identifier”)
at a given date. The possibility of linking firm- and worker-information is particularly helpful
for our estimation strategy which relies on a firm characteristic: the date of shut-down of a
plant. Firm information is also helpful in making plant-closure workers more comparable to
workers in ongoing firms. A second feature is that these two data sets provide high-quality and
comprehensive information on expenditures associated with a worker’s health status. As health
insurance is mandatory for Austrian employees and covers all costs associated with primary
health care such as treatment by physicians, drug prescriptions, and hospitalized care, the data
give a very detailed and comprehensive picture of the health expenditures caused by a given
individual.13
The payments recorded in the data can be broadly divided into the following four categories
(see Table A.1 in the appendix for a definition of these and more detailed categories used in the
empirical analysis below):
11The data are collected for the primary purpose of calculating a worker’s old age social security benefits.
The Central Social Security Administration gets its data from the health insurance funds and processes this
information for the purpose of calculating old-age social security benefits. So retrospective data from the Central
Social Security Administration are collected in the same way as the recent data from the health insurance fund.
12There are separate funds for private-sector employees, self-employed, farmers, public sector workers, and
employees of several public utility firms. The data available to us comprises the universe of private sector workers
only.
13On top of mandatory public health insurance, individuals may purchase supplementary insurance offered by
private insurance companies. The main provisions provided by these companies are higher quality standards during
hospitalization (e.g. single bedrooms) which amount to more than 80% of all benefits paid by private insurers.
Costs covered by these supplementary contracts are on top of provisions covered by public health insurance. Hence
no substitution of public health costs by private health insurance takes place. Overall the fraction of expenditures
covered by private health insurance contracts well below 10 percent of total health expenditures. In 2003, total
costs covered by the private health insurers amounted to 1.3 billion Euros which compares to health expenditures
of 16.7 billion Euros covered by the the public health insurance system. Moreover, private health insurance is
purchased predominantely by high-income individuals which are underrepresented among plant closure workers
(Versicherungsverband O¨sterreich, 2005).
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(i) Sickness benefits. These are payments during periods of sickness to employed workers
not capable of searching for a new job or unemployed workers not capable of working. When
unemployed, sickness benefits are roughly equal to unemployment benefits. Additionally, days
of sickness benefits do not reduce the number of remaining days for which an unemployed worker
is eligible for regular unemployment benefits. When employed, a worker initially continues to
receive his wage during up to the first 12 weeks of his sick leave spell (depending on previous
tenure). Thereafter the health insurance provides sickness benefits amounting to 80% of the
previous wage. In order to claim sickness benefits, a physician has to approve and repeatedly
check a worker’s impaired health situation. Our data cover all days on sick leave but only the
sickness benefits paid by health insurance. We therefore provide separate results for sickness
benefits and days on sick leave. Sickness benefits may be higher for workers getting ill after
a plant closure because the closing plant can not continue to pay the wage for the initial 12
week period or because plant closure workers are more likely to enter sickness insurance from
unemployment. Plant closure workers are thus more likely to be receiving sickness benefits paid
by health insurance. The situation is different for a worker getting sick in an ongoing firm. This
means that sickness benefits increase mechanically for workers in plant closure firms as compared
to workers in continuing firms. However, days on sick leave are recorded for all workers alike.
(ii) Consultations. Doctors have contracts with the public health insurance and get paid a
standardized rate for each consultation.
(iii) Hospitalization. The data record each hospitalization and detail the particular reason
for the hospitalization. In particular, it classifies the costs by the main diagnosis of the hospital-
ization according to the ninth revision of the International Classification of Diseases and Related
Health Problems (ICD-9). We aggregate the diagnoses based on ICD-9 codes into the following
causes for hospitalization: cancer, heart disease, mental health problems, respiratory diseases,
cerebrovascular diseases, hospitalization related to pregnancy, and all other hospitalizations. We
thereby focus on major causes of death, some of which are potentially related to stress and thus
to involuntary job loss.14 The exact classification is largely borrowed from Keefe et al. (2002).
(iv) Drug prescriptions including detailed types of prescribed drugs. The data record all pay-
ments to drug stores or refunds to individuals for prescribed and self-medicated drugs. The data
are extremely detailed concerning the type of drugs. We classify the drugs into a category that
is “specific” to treat health problems associated with job loss and unemployment and a residual
category of non-specific drugs. Among specific drugs we distinguish between “psychosomatic”
14Unfortunately, the data do not contain the ICD9 codes indicating self-inflicted injuries or other external
injuries. This may signify either that self-inflicted injuries are not prevalent or that these diagnoses have been
recoded into other codes. In any case, our data do not permit discussing separate results for self-inflicted injuries.
9
drugs targeted at psychosomatic aﬄictions (such as migraine therapeutics, anti-inflammatory
drugs, and so on) and “psychotropic” drugs treating psychological distress (such as, for example,
sedatives, benzodiazepins, and antidepressants).
Individuals who take up public health care provisions have to pay a non-negligible fraction of
actual health costs themselves. According to the rules that were in place in 2003, immediately
after the end of our observation period, the deductible was a fixed amount of 4.25 Euros for
each prescription of a medical drug, 3.63 Euros for doctor consultation, 10.90 Euros for each
outpatient treatment (with a maximum of 73.67 Euro per year). No deductible accrues for
inpatient treatments. Hofmarcher et al. (2004) estimate the total amount of these co-payments
to about 11 percent of overall health expenditures (excluding sickness benefits) in 2002.
3.2 Definition of plant closure
Because we study the causal impact of job loss on public health costs using plant closure as
exogenous source of job loss, we have to be precise about how we define a plant closure and how
we define a job loss due to a plant closure.
Definition of plant closure firms. To identify plant closure in our data it is particularly
helpful that employer and employee information can be matched. A firm is considered as a plant
closure firm if the following criteria are met: (i) There has to be positive employment through
at least 12 months up to some month t and zero employment from month t+ 1 through month
t+ 12. (ii) If a firm disappears at date t, no more than 50% of the employees switch to the same
employer at date t+1. This latter criterion is adopted to rule out misclassification of a take-over
as a plant closure. Whenever more than 50% of the employees are found under an identical new
firm identifier these observations are excluded from the sample. To make the distinction between
plant closure firms and non-plant closure firms as clear-cut as possible all firms with large and
long-lasting drops in employment, and thus all workers employed in theses firms, are excluded
from the sample.15 We also excluded all firms with less than 3 employees from the data because
if such a firm disappears, it is likely that this is just a recoding of the firm identifier rather
than a plant closure. We consider all plant closures that take place between January 1999 and
December 2001, using the 10th of each month as the baseline date. This ensures that we have
at least one year of health insurance information before and after the plant closure date for each
observation.
15A distressed firm is defined as a firm with (i) a large drop in its workforce of at least 30% between t and t+1,
and (ii) it does not recover quickly, i.e. its workforce remains under 80% of its original workforce (in period t) for
the three succeeding months. The second criterion ensures that firms with a strong seasonal employment pattern
do not count as plant closures.
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Definition of plant closure and non-plant closure workers. Our plant closure sample
(PC) consists of all workers, who are employed in the month of plant closure or who were
employed at least one month during the year before plant closure in the case that they left
before the effective shut-down of the plant and hence our sample covers both “stayers” and
“early leavers”. Our control sample consists of all workers who are neither employed in a plant
closure nor a distressed firm in a given point in time. Notice that we allow workers to be included
in the control sample repeatedly.16
We measure monthly health care costs relative to the plant closure date for plant closure
workers and relative to the reference date for non-plant closure workers. The plant closure date
is the 10th day of the month before the plant closes for “stayers” and the 10th day of the month
before leaving the firm for “early leavers”.17 The reference date for control workers is the 10th
day of the month in which the control workers are sampled.18 In the following, we use the term
“plant closure date” to identify the plant closure date for plant closure workers and the reference
date for control workers.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 illustrates the construction of our dataset. We first identify all closing firms for each
reference date between January 1999 and December 2001. In a second step, we identify all
workers employed in the closing firms. In the third step, we draw a stratified random sample
of workers who are employed in firms that do not close (stratified by the size of the firm). The
fourth and final step consists of constructing individual information on the work history and
the take-up of health care costs during the year before and the year after the plant closure or
reference date, respectively.
16Due to the huge number of potential control workers, we draw a random sample of workers employed in non-
plant closure firms. Non-plant closure workers are sampled randomly among all workers employed in non-plant
closure firms and non-distressed firms. Specifically, on each reference date between January 1999 and December
2001, we take a 2.5% random sample from the universe of the control group of all small firms (3 or 4 employees)
and a 0.25% sample of all larger firms (more than 4 employees). However, because our empirical strategy relies
on the comparison of the PC group with a selected group of the control workers only, it will also take care of the
sampling scheme using unequal probabilities.
17For instance, suppose a firm is active on the 10th of January 2000 but no longer active in any of the subsequent
12 months. The plant closure date of workers who are employed in this firm on the 10th of January 2000 is the
10th of January 2000. An “early leaver” is a worker who has been employed in this firm on the 10th of February
1999 (10th of March 1999, ..., 10th of December 1999). The plant closure date for this worker is the 10th of
February 1999 (10th of March 1999, ..., 10th of December 1999).
18For instance, suppose a control worker is included in the random sample drawn on 10th of January 2000. This
individual’s reference date is the 10th of January 2000. Moreover, this individual is going to be used to estimate
the counterfactual for all workers employed in plants that close between the 10th of January 2000 and the 10th
of February 2000.
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4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Comparing PC and NPC workers using propensity score matching
Clearly, estimating the causal effect of job loss on health by cross section or panel data may
potentially lead to a bias because of the endogeneity of a job loss.19 To tackle the problem of
endogeneity we focus on job loss due to plant closure. The central idea is that being employed
in a plant closure firm results in job loss with certainty whereas being employed in a non-plant
closure firm results in job loss with much lower probability. Moreover and more importantly,
being employed in a plant closure firm is likely to be unrelated to a worker’s ex-ante health
status. This means that we can study the effect of job displacement on public health costs by
comparing PC workers to NPC workers. Let Zi be a binary variable that equals 1 if a person
is employed in a plant closure firm at the plant closure date and 0 if a person is employed in a
firm that continues to exist at the very same date. Further, define Y Ziit as the payments incurred
by the health insurance fund that are associated with take-up of health insurance provisions of
a particular individual i in the period t ∈ {b, a}, where t = b is the period before the reference
date and t = a is the year after the reference date (as defined in Figure 1). Y 1it thus refers to
the health costs in the case of actual job loss and Y 0it refers to health costs accruing in the case
of no job loss. Our aim is to recover the average causal effect of job loss due to plant closure on
public health costs for workers actually experiencing job loss from the data:20
E(Y 1ia − Y 0ia|Zi = 1) (1)
This is the average causal effect of plant closure induced job displacement on workers employed
in plant closure firms. Note that plant closure induced job loss is not exactly the same as job
loss. Job loss due to plant closure both tends to be unexpected and unrelated to individual
performance on the job. Of course, some job losses also occur in NPC firms, mainly because of
poor performance on the job or because firms downsize their workforce in response to negative
shocks. However, it is unlikely that not accounting for involuntary job loss in the control group
will bias our estimates. On the one hand, most employment relationships in NPC firms are not
dissolved at the reference date. On the other hand, many employment relationships that are
actually dissolved are voluntary quits and result in job-to-job moves. As a result there is almost
a one-to-one relationship between being employed in a plant closure firm and involuntarily losing
19A similar endogeneity problem has been discussed in studies estimating the causal effect of education on
health (Chevalier and Feinstein, 2006).
20Clearly, the second term of the difference in not directly observed and must be estimated from the group of
NPC workers. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) provide an up-to-date survey of empirical methods dealing with
this fundamental problem.
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one’s job. The key assumption necessary to identify the causal effect of job loss via plant closure
on public health costs states that plant closure is independent of potential health cost outcomes,
conditional on observed characteristics Xi (including individual- and firm-specific variables) and
workers’ health status before plant closure Yib:
(Y 1ia, Y
0
ia) ⊥⊥ Zi|Xi, Yib (2)
Assumption (2) essentially states that plant closure is as good as randomly assigned, once
differences in Xi and Yib are taken account of.21 This implies that the health status of a
worker must not cause the plant closure, once observable characteristics Xi and the workers’
pre-PC health status Yib have been taken into account. In principle, plant closure might affect
health through channels other than job loss. For instance, tighter local budgets might imply
deteriorating quality of health care which might negatively affect health in turn. We believe
that it is unlikely that such spillovers give rise to direct effects of plant closure on health for two
reasons. First, our descriptive analysis indicates that plant closures are small compared to the
average employer within a region hence it is unlikely that they generate major regional spillover
effects. Second, regional spillover effects would also affect treatment and control group alike
thus leaving the difference between the two groups largely unaffected.
We control for potential confounding variables by matching treated observations with non-
treated observations using propensity scores which is defined as the conditional probability of
being employed in a plant closure firm, Pr(Zi = 1|Xi, Yib).22 To estimate the propensity score,
we use a vector of control variables Xi which includes age, tenure, days in employment, days in
unemployment, overall health costs, days on sick leave, white collar status, firm size as well as
dummy variables for region and industry of the employer and for calendar year and month.23
All socio-demographic background variables and firm size are measured at the date immediately
before the plant closure. Health measures are based on quarters 4 and 3 before the plant closes
(or the reference date). We do not match on health costs in the half-year immediately preceding
the plant closure so as to take potential health effects stemming from anticipation of job loss
21The second key assumption states that we observe both treated and control units for all possible values of
the covariates, implying that the conditional distribution of Zi given the covariates completely overlaps.
22Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that matching on the propensity score is equivalent to matching on every
dimension that feeds the score. See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a recent survey of matching methods based
on the propensity score.
23In terms of health cost measures, we have opted for a very parsimonious model specification for the estimation
of the propensity score because we are interested in how well a parsimonious specification is able to balance
covariates. It turns out that this parsimonious specification suffices to achieve balance for a large number of
covariates - including the detailed health costs (see new Table 1). Moreover, Table A.2 in the appendix shows
that - as expected - health costs are not very important predictors of being a plant closure worker. We have
therefore decided to keep the parsimonious specification of the propensity score.
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into account. The estimation of the propensity score is performed separately for women and
men to account for the pronounced differences in labor market attachment between women
and men.24 We then look, for each treated individual, for its nearest neighbor in terms of the
estimated propensity score. To match treated and controls we use a simple two step algorithm.
The first step estimates the propensity score using information on pre-determined variables Xi
and pre-plant closure health Yib. The second step matches one control observation (i.e. an
observation with Zi = 0) to each treated observation (i.e. observations with Zi = 1), using
control observations potentially several times.25
4.2 Quality of the matching procedure
Table 1 compares descriptive statistics of PC, all NPC and matched NPC workers for the year
before the plant closure date. Panel A of table 1 reports pre-PC health cost indicators whereas
panel B reports descriptives relating to individual characteristics and pre-PC labor market in-
dicators.26 To assess the balance in covariates, table 1 also shows the standardized bias both
before and after matching as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).27
Table 1 about here
For males, we see that total health costs during the year before the plant closure averages 499
Euros for PC workers but only 434 Euros for NPC workers. Is this a large or a small difference?
The standardized bias in health measures before plant closure is below 5 – a threshold deemed
small (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) – for all health measures except for consultations and days
on sick leave. Matching is highly effective in reducing standardized bias below 5 for days on
sick leave and to -7 for consultations. For females, standardized bias before matching is low
for all health measures except for days on sick leave. Matching is again effective in reducing
standardized bias from 9.8 to 7.0. Overall, differences in pre-PC health costs appear rather
small to begin with on average and are for the most part substantially reduced by our matching
24We use a probit model to estimate the propensity score. Table A.2 in the appendix reports the corresponding
coefficients.
25Inference is somewhat complicated because the propensity score needs to be estimated. Bootstrapping ac-
counts for the variability of the propensity score estimates but is computationally intensive. We therefore report
both bootstrap standard errors (based on 500 bootstrap samples) and on conventional standard errors assuming
that we have information on the true propensity score. Lechner (2002) shows that ignoring sampling variance due
to propensity score estimation does not lead to different inference compared to bootstrap estimates of standard
errors.
26Note differences in health measures in the year prior to plant closure that remain after matching could reflect
anticipatory effects. We discuss anticipatory effects in Table 3.
27The standardized bias is defined as the absolute value of the difference in sample means between treated
and control units as a percentage of the square root of the average of the two sample variances We also show the
proportional reduction in the standardized bias, which is defined as the proportional reduction in the standardized
bias after matching. A standardized value below 5 would clearly be judged as sufficient, as noted by Caliendo and
Kopeinig (2008, p.48). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) view standardized bias above 20 as large and note that the
percent reduction in bias is unstable for lower values before matching.
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procedure. This suggests that using health costs before the plant closure date in the matching
procedure is probably of minor importance only, relative to the importance of pre-PC labor
market outcomes.
The matching procedure looks particularly good in terms of individual characteristics and
pre-PC labor market outcomes (see panel B of table 1). The major differences between PC
workers and the full NPC sample refer to job tenure for men and wage and firm size for women.
These differences disappear almost entirely when we compare the PC workers to the matched
NPC sample. The reduction in standardized bias shows that our matching procedure is able to
eliminate most of the existing imbalance in covariates. This holds for males and females alike.
A final check of the quality of the matching procedure comes from a comparison of the
distribution of propensity scores of PC and NPC workers (see figure A.1 in the appendix).
While the distribution of the estimated propensity score of the unmatched NPC workers has
a very high density at low scores and is thus very different from the distribution of matched
NPC workers, the distribution of the matched workers closely resembles the distribution of PC
workers, and there is thus almost complete overlap in the estimated propensity score28. We
conclude that the matching procedure works very well for our purpose and that confounding
factors should not contaminate a comparison of PC and matched NPC workers.
5 Results
5.1 The causal effect of involuntary job loss on public health costs
Our estimate of the causal effect of job loss on public health costs is based on a comparison of
post displacement histories of PC workers with matched NPC workers. In table 2 we provide
evidence on differences between these two groups as regards post-displacement health costs. We
immediately see that overall health costs are higher for male PC workers than for male matched
NPC workers. This difference is substantial and amounts to 468 Euros during the first year
after the plant closure. Interestingly, the difference is almost entirely due to sickness benefits
whereas the difference with respect to direct costs for health care is very small and insignificant.
Digging deeper reveals that consultations of doctors by PC workers is significantly lower whereas
hospitalizations and medical drug expenditures are somewhat higher, albeit not significant.29
28For men, 87 out of 8310 treated units are outside the common support (or about 1%). For women, only 19
out of 4257 treated units lie outside the common support (less than 0.5%). Moreover, because those observations
outside the common support have very similar average propensity score as their matched control observations, we
decided to keep these observations in the analysis.
29The numbers in tables 1 and 2 show that health costs not only increase for PC workers but for matched NPC
workers as well. There are several possible reasons for this. First, one of the most important predictors of health
costs, age, increases by one year for all PC and NPC workers. Second, this increase also reflects the general strong
upward trend in public health expenditures (overall health costs increased by 6% from 1998 to 1999). Third,
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Table 2 about here
Table 2 shows that the bulk of the increase in health costs after a plant closure is due
to a huge increase in sickness benefits. Male PC workers draw on average sickness benefits
amounting to 691 Euros in the first post displacement year. This is a dramatic increase in
sickness benefit payments, as during the pre-displacement year only 253 Euros were spent on
PC workers. Almost the same amount (235 Euros) was spent for the matched control group,
implying that plant closure increases expenditures by 453 Euros (or 180 percent) within the first
post-displacement year. However, there are several explanations for this huge increase. First,
increases in sickness benefits could indicate actual health problems because sickness benefits
are only paid after a medical check by a physician. Hence workers receiving these benefits are,
arguably, in an adverse health situation. Second, sickness benefits are higher than unemployment
benefits, suggesting that unemployed workers have an incentive to get access to these benefits.
Moreover, sickness benefits interrupt unemployment benefit payments and thus postpone the
date when unemployment benefits lapse, implying that take-up of sickness benfits may partly
reflect incentives created by these rules rather than adverse health only. A third reason relates to
administrative rules governing the payment of sickness benefits. For employed workers, sickness
benefits have to be paid by the employer for the first 12 weeks since the start of health-related
workplace absence. For unemployed workers, in contrast, sickness benefits are paid by the public
health insurance fund right from the start. As unemployment increases strongly after a job loss
due to plant closure, sickness benefits for PC workers may increase mechanically due to sickness
benefit rules, because we only observe payments made by the public fund. We can assess which
of the above reasons is driving the increase in sickness benefit payments. The data set does not
only report the amount of sickness benefits paid to the worker but also the number of days a
worker draws such benefits (see row 4 of table 2). Interestingly, days on sick leave do not change
among male PC workers. On average, PC and matched control workers are receiving sickness
benefits over 12.9 and 11.4 days, respectively. The difference is significantly different from zero,
but much smaller relative to the corresponding increase in sickness benefits and thus suggests
that both direct health effects and incentive effects (i.e. gaining access to higher and longer
benefits) are of minor importance. The bulk of the increase in sickness benefits is driven by the
fact that PC workers enter unemployment which in turn raises sickness benefits to be paid by
the public insurance agency.
workers in the PC and matched NPC sample have to be employed in order to be included in our sample. Being
employed, they are more likely to experience a positive health shock (leading to a negative health cost shock).
Simple mean reversion might therefore explain a substantial part of the increase in health expenditures after the
reference date.
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A closer look at outcomes for core health care categories indicates that costs associated with
consultations of physicians are considerably lower for PC workers than for matched NPC workers
(table 2, row 5). PC workers see doctors less often and incur costs of the order of 85 Euro in the
year after the reference date. The corresponding figure is 95 Euros for matched NPC workers,
giving rise to a statistically significant difference of 10 Euros in costs. However, recall that these
costs have been lower for PC workers already in the pre-displacement year. This calls for a
careful investigation of the sensitivity of this result with respect to an identification strategy
that controls more directly for differences in pre-displacement health costs. Concerning expenses
related to hospitalizations and the prescription of medical drugs, the empirical results point to
slightly, though insignificantly, higher expenditures for PC workers compared to matched NPC
workers (table 2, rows 6 and 7).
Unlike for men, results for women do not indicate a significant difference in terms of overall
health costs (table 2, row 1). Whereas average public health costs in the post-displacement year
amount to 934 Euros for female PC workers and are thus almost the same as for male workers,
the corresponding amount for matched NPC women is only 732 Euros. The resulting difference
of 202 Euros is not significantly different from zero.
Interestingly, separating overall health costs into costs related to sickness benefits and re-
maining health costs reveals a pattern that is very much in line with the pattern that shows
up for men. Sickness benefit payments are almost twice as high for women employed in closing
plants (441 Euros) compared to sickness benefits going to women employed in surviving plants
(238 Euros). The difference of 203 Euros is both statistically and economically significant. Again
we can check to which extent this increase is driven by bad health and/or an effect on incentives,
or by mechanical increases in these payments that arise from a high incidence of unemployment
after a plant closure. We find that the situation is similar for women. The difference in days
claiming sickness benefits between the treated and the control group is substantial and amounts
to about 15 percent. Nevertheless, this compares to differences in sickness benefits payments
between the two groups of almost 100 percent. Hence, similar to the situation for males, we
conclude that for female PC workers the increase in public health costs is also dominated by the
mechanical increase due to sickness benefit rules. Results for doctor visits, hospitalizations, and
drug prescriptions are for the most part not significantly different from zero (table 2, rows 5-7).
5.2 Dynamic evolution of health costs
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the difference in overall health costs between PC workers and
matched NPC workers by quarter to/since the date plant closure, separately for men (panel a)
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and women (panel b). This figure clearly shows that overall health costs are balanced in all
four quarters before the reference date, albeit this holds true almost by construction for the
second half-year before the plant closure date because overall health costs in this half-year enter
the estimation of the propensity score. The difference between treated and controls for males
and females lies with the range of minus 25 to plus 10 Euros per quarter during the entire year
before the plant closure. In contrast, public health costs shoot up in the first and second quarter
after plant closure for both male and female PC workers. The point estimates for excess health
expenditures per quarter lie between 75 and about 160 Euros per quarter for men, and somewhat
less for women. We also see that excess health costs are significantly different from zero for men
during the first two post-displacement quarters, level off thereafter and are no longer significant
in the remaining two quarters. For women, the time pattern of the point estimates is quite
similar, but most of the estimates are not significantly different from zero, mainly due to large
standard errors.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 3 provides more detailed evidence on the dynamics of public health costs immediately
before and after the plant closure. Panel a) shows that the time pattern of excess sickness benefit
payments is driving the dynamics of overall health costs. Both male and female PC workers
cause a larger amount of sickness benefit payroll for the public health agency than matched
NPC workers. The difference is strongly significant for men and attains marginal statistical
significance for women in the second quarter after plant closure. Panel b) shows the dynamics
of days on sickness benefits. We see a significant increase in excess days claiming sickness
benefits during the last quarter before the plant closure and the first quarter after the plant
closure for both men and women. To the extent that days on sickness benefits reflect actual
health problems this suggests that mental or physical disorders may already emerge prior to the
plant closure date in anticipation of a job loss. Panel c) shows excess health costs excluding
payments for sickness benefits. Both for men and for women, excess health costs do not show
a particular temporal pattern. Both male and female PC workers have costs of about the same
amount as their matched NPC counterparts, both before and after plant closure. Panel d)
displays excess costs for doctor visits. These costs are already lower for male PC workers than
for the matched NPC workers before plant closure. The difference in consultation costs widens
somewhat in the second and third quarter after plant closure, thereby yielding significantly lower
expenses due to doctor visits identified in table 2. Yet, the fact that costs due to doctor visits
are lower in the periods before the plant closure is consistent with unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity introducing a downward bias into the simple contrast between PC workers and
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matched NPC workers. Panels a) and b) of figure 4 show that the excess costs for hospitalizations
and medical drugs do not show a systematic time pattern and are very similar before and after
the plant closure. The remaining two panels of figure 4 show excess costs related to mental
health problems (hospitalization due to mental health problems and costs accruing from the
prescription of psychotropic drugs). For both indicators, there emerges an interesting difference
between men and women. While for women the dynamics of excess health costs related to
mental diseases do not seem to be affected by job loss, we see a significant pattern for men. For
male PC workers, both health cost indicators are significantly higher than for matched NPC
workers.
Figures 3 and 4 about here
To study potential effects from anticipating the plant closure, table 3 compares health costs
incurred in the half-year immediately preceding the reference date in the PC and matched
NPC sample. There is no significant difference in overall costs. Basing inference on bootstrap
standard errors, we find no effect on any health cost subgroup for men. In contrast, women
tend to spend 1.6 days more on sick leave already in the half year before plant closure. While
this effect may signify deteriorating health from the anticipation of job loss, the simultaneous
absence of any effect on both overall and detailed health costs may rather suggest that part of
the female workforce of closing firms leaves the labor force before the actual shut-down of the
firm by applying for sickness benefits rather than unemployment benefits.
Table 3 about here
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
Table 4 discusses the sensitivity of our main results in Table 2 by adding the full list of control
variables discussed in the previous section to control for any imbalances in covariates remaining
after the matching procedure. Moreover, we account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
by taking first differences in health outcomes. Column 1 in table 4 simply reproduces the main
result of table 2, column 2 adds controls, and column 3 displays the estimates from using first
differences.30 For males, the key result that health costs are higher for PC workers than for
matched NPC workers remains present, whether we control for covariates or we use differences
in health outcomes (columns 2 and 3). Whereas the baseline result suggests that health costs
increase by 468 Euros, adding controls reduces this effect to 432 Euros, and using first-differences
30Recall that health care costs in the half year prior to plant closure might be affected by anticipatory effects.
We therefore define the difference in health care costs to reflect health costs during the year after the plant closure
minus twice the health costs during quarters 4 and 3 before plant closure.
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decreases it further to 441 Euros. Incremental health costs are primarily due to increases in
sickness benefits, estimated to be between 383 Euros (first differences) to 453 Euros (without
controls). Interestingly, the negative effect on expenditures due to consultations as well as the
effect on days on sick leave from the baseline estimates disappear when adopting a difference
specification. This likely indicates that the ex-ante differences in expenditures due to doctor
visits are driving the baseline results rather than being a genuine effect of plant closure induced
job displacement. None of the remaining health measures are sensitive to adding controls or to
estimating in first differences.
Table 4 about here
The results for women indicate that the baseline effect on overall health costs for women
is statistically different from zero (when inference is based on robust standard errors), both in
the specification that adds controls and the specification that looks at first differences. This
suggests that there is a lot of heterogeneity in health expenditures that is related to observed
and unobserved ex-ante differences between women. Again, the sensitivity analysis confirms the
main conclusion that health costs increase due to sickness benefits – the magnitude of the effect
is much in line with the baseline result. None of the remaining health measures are sensitive to
adding controls or to estimating in first differences.
5.4 Detailed results
We also provide results concerning more disaggregate health measures. Arguably, job loss is
likely to be related to health conditions that have to do with mental health. Other serious
health problems such as cancer, heart disease, respiratory diseases, and stroke are less likely to
change immediately after job loss. We therefore provide separate results of the effects of job
loss on these dimensions of health care. Table 5 provides the results for hospitalizations. The
grouping of health conditions is based on ICD-9 codes associated with any medical expenditure
contained in our dataset. The first line in this table repeats the entry regarding hospitalization
from table 4.
Table 5 about here
Detailed hospitalization results for men indicate that there are no significant effects of job
displacement on conditions associated with cancer, heart disease, respiratory disease or stroke. In
contrast, expenditures related to mental health conditions increase significantly, albeit the effect
is economically rather small. The baseline result that compare PC workers with NPC workers
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suggests that expenditures on mental health hospitalizations are 17 Euros higher for men. This
baseline estimate turns out to be robust to controlling for observed characteristics (column 2)
and unobserved time invariant characteristics (column 3). Thus, detailed hospitalization results
for men suggest that the weak and insignificant overall effect for men is entirely due to an
increase in mental health expenditures.
Columns 4 to 6 of table 5 present the corresponding results for women. We find that excess
health costs due to hospitalization for health problems related to cancer, heart disease, mental
problems, respiratory disease, and strokes are largely unaffected by job loss due to plant closure.
However, women employed by closing plants incur 26 Euros higher public health costs related
to a pregnancy. One possible explanation (though not the only one) is that a job loss induces
women to adjust the timing of their children.
We also provide more specific results for drug prescriptions. Table 6 groups drugs into
“specific” and “non-specific” drugs. Specific drugs are those that are arguably used to treat
symptoms potentially related to job loss. These include drugs that are used to treat psychoso-
matic disorders (such as back pains) and psychotropic drugs (e.g. antidepressants). The first
line in table 6 repeats the baseline estimate from table 4.
Table 6 about here
Results for men indicate that overall consumption of specific drugs remains unaffected by job
loss. However, while psychosomatic drugs reveal a slightly negative point estimate, the effect on
psychotropic drugs is positive and significantly different from zero but quantitatively of minor
importance. Men who are employed in closing plants cause about 2.8 Euros more costs for
psychotropic drugs than similar men employed in continuing plants. This effect is not sensitive
to adding control variables but gets somewhat smaller (about 1.7 Euros) when looking a first
difference approach.
Detailed results for women do not suggest any effect of job loss on consumption of drugs.
If anything, the point estimates indicate lower drug consumption among PC women compared
to matched NPC women. These results reinforce the finding from the detailed hospitalization
categories showing that costs related to mental health increase for men but do not change for
women. The reason why women do not face mental health problems may be that women face
less financial distress as many (particularly married) women have their basic economic needs
guaranteed by other household income. Moreover, according to the traditional division of labor
within the family women may find it easier to replace the emotional rewards formerly provided
by their job with their role in the family causing less emotional distress. In fact, our result that
job loss increases the likelihood of a pregnancy is also consistent with this latter hypothesis.
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6 Conclusions
This paper studies the causal effect of job loss on public expenditures on health care. Our
empirical analysis focuses on the case of Austria where public health insurance is mandatory for
all employees. To tackle the problem of reverse causality we focus on analyzing job loss due to
plant closure because plant closure leads to job loss without being caused by a worker’s health.
We assess the causal relationship between individual job loss and public health care costs by
exploiting a data set that combines detailed information on a worker’s earnings and employment
history with detailed information on payments by the public health insurance authority. These
payments are associated with the take-up of health care benefits and are comprehensive in that
they include both treatment-related health care and the dimension of income insurance (payment
of sickness benefits).
Our empirical analysis yields several interesting results. First, it turns out that job loss
following a plant closure does not cause a significant increase in public health costs associated
with take-up of health provisions. Public health costs due to hospitalizations, doctor visits,
and medical drugs’ prescriptions do not increase significantly. Second, while overall take-up of
health care is not significantly affected, we find – for males, but not for females – an increase
in public health costs due to mental health problems. This result is in line with the hypothesis
that unemployment causes mental health problems whereas physical health appears to be largely
unaffected. Third, we find that the public health costs that are associated with payments of
sickness benefits strongly increase after a job loss. However, this increase in costs does not reflect
a deteriorating health status of displaced workers but is mainly due to sickness benefit rules.
We do not find that male plant closure workers spend more days on sick leave. While there is
an increase in days on sick leave for women, the effect is not robust and small compared to the
overall increase in sick leave payments.
The estimated effects of short-run public costs due to direct health care provisions appear
small. While such a result is in line with Browning et al. (2006) who do not find a significant
impact of displacement on hospitalizations for stress-related diseases for Danish men, other
recent studies have found that plant closures cause significant health problems for displaced
workers. Gerdtham and Johannesson (2003) and Eliason and Storrie (2009) find that being
unemployed increases mortality in Sweden over longer time horizons. Sullivan and von Wachter
(2006) give similar results for the U.S. One reason might be our focus on short-run health costs.
Immediate health effects of unemployment may not show up in physical health conditions but
more likely in mental health. In fact, for males, we find significantly higher public health costs
associated with purchases of psychotropic drugs and also for hospitalizations due to mental
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health problems. We note, however, that while these effects are statistically significant they are
economically small.
A further reason why the estimated health cost effects are small could be that our plant-
closure sample of plant closure consists disproportionately of blue collar workers who are often
subject to more dangerous and unhealthy working conditions. Job loss means temporary ab-
sence from such working conditions may reduce health differences between displaced and com-
parable non-displaced workers. Another reason could be take-up behavior. Deductibles are
non-negligible and workers who experience extended periods of unemployment and substantial
income losses may abstain from seeking medical treatment. However, disregarding such health
problems in the short run, while reducing current public health costs, could materialize in worse
health conditions and higher public health costs of job loss in the long run.
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Figure 1: Setup and definitions
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Figure 2: Overall health costs
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(a) Men
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(b) Women
Notes: The graphs show the estimated treatment effect and its corresponding
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval (based on 500 replications). The outcome
variable is overall health costs for each of the eight quarters, centered around
the plant closure (reference) date.
35
Figure 3: Detailed health costs
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(a) Sick pay
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(b) Days on sick leave
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(c) Overall health costs (excl. sick pay)
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(d) Doctoral visits
Notes: The graphs show the estimated treatment effect and its corresponding
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval (based on 500 replications). The figures
on the left (right) show results for men (women). The outcome variable is the
corresponding health measure for each of the eight quarters, centered around
the plant closure (reference) date.
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Figure 4: Detailed health costs, continued
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(a) Hospitalizations (all diagnoses)
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(b) Hospitalizations (mental diagnoses only)
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(c) Medical drugs (all)
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(d) Medical drugs (psychotropic only)
Notes: The graphs show the estimated treatment effect and its corresponding
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval (based on 500 replications). The figures
on the left (right) show results for men (women). The outcome variable is the
corresponding health measure for each of the eight quarters, centered around
the plant closure (reference) date.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Health Indicators: Definitions
Indicator Definition
Consultations Includes all costs arising from consultations by a physician
Drugs Includes all costs arising from prescribed or selfmedicated
drugs
Psychosomatic drugs: Includes drugs targeted at treating psychosomatic aﬄictions
(e.g. migraine therapeutics, antiinflammatory drugs)
Psychotropic drugs: Includes drugs targeted at treating psychological stress
(e.g. sedatives, benzodiazepins, antidepressants)
Specific drugs: Includes psychosomatic and psychotropic drugs
Overall: Includes all drugs
Hospitalization Includes costs due to hospitalization. These costs are classified
by the main diagnosis of the hospitalization (ICD-9 codes)
Cancer: Includes ICD-9 Codes 140–239
Heart: Includes ICD-9 Codes 391, 392.0, 393–398,
402, 404, 410–429
Mental: Includes ICD-9 Codes 290–319, V70.1, V70.2, V71.0
Respiratory: Incudes ICD-9 Codes 460–519
Cerebrovascular: Includes ICD-9 Codes 430–438
Other: Includes hospitalization due to all other reasons
Overall: Includes hospitalization due to any cause
Pregnancy: Includes ICD-9 Codes 630–676
Incapacity to Work Includes all costs arising from being on sick leave (“Krankengeld”)
Overall costs Includes the overall costs from consultations, drugs, hospitalisaiton,
and days on sick leave
Notes: All variables covering health costs are measured in nominal Euros. The classification of main
causes of hospitalization is largely taken from Keefe et al. (2002).
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Table A.2: Coefficient estimates, propensity score
PC = 1
Men Women
Mean 0.261 0.227
Standard deviation 0.439 0.419
Age (in years) 0.004??? −0.005???
(0.001) (0.001)
Tenure within the last five years (in years) −0.147??? −0.085???
(0.006) (0.008)
White-collar −0.101??? 0.098???
(0.024) (0.029)
Wage (in 100 e ) 0.001??? −0.001???
(0.000) (0.000)
Days employed (before) −0.005??? −0.004???
(0.000) (0.000)
Days unemployed (before) 0.000?? −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of employees −0.004??? −0.003???
(0.000) (0.000)
Overall health costs (3 quarters before) −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Overall health costs (4 quarters before) 0.000 −0.000?
(0.000) (0.000)
Days on sick leave (3 quarters before) 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Days on sick leave (4 quarters before) −0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
n 31, 851 18, 784
LL −13032.373 −7207.593
Pseudo R2 0.287 0.283
p-value (χ2) 0.000 0.000
Notes: ?, ??, ??? denotes statistical significance on the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respec-
tively. The table shows coefficients from a probit model where the PC dummy is the
dependent variable. There are 8 industry dummies, 28 regional dummies and 15 time
dummies (year and month).
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Figure A.1: Distribution of the propensity score
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Notes: The figure shows the kernel density estimate of the distribution of the propensity
score. Table A.2 shows the corresponding parameter estimates.
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